Introduction
It is well-known that an upstream monopolist (UM) has an incentive to integrate forward with firms in related downstream industries (DIs) as a means of practicing implicit third-degree price discrimination.1 This type of integration has involved situations in which the DIs are perfectly competitive, of course, characterized by classical free entryexit properties. This type of model also restricts the DIs into which the UM can integrate and successfully practice implicit price discrimination to the sets in which relatively elastic derived demands apply. Otherwise, the practice of price discrimination through integra tion would generate decreased input prices for non-integrated firms. Thus entry into the newly integrated sector would be open, and the gains from forward integration associated with attempts to practice implicit price discrimination would be eliminated. 2 Moreover, in the cases where the UM practices implicit price discrimination through forward integra tion, the effect on social welfare is ambiguous.3 As well-known, the UM also has an incentive to integrate vertically with a down stream monopolist (DM). 4 This type of integration increases joint profits by eliminating the inefficiency associated with successive monopolies. Since the optimal price selected for the newly integrated DI falls as a direct consequence of the integration, the social welfare effect is definitely positive. It warrants special emphasis in this regard that a paper (Romano 1988 ) considers vertical integration when the UM serves a set of monopol ized DIs. In this case, the UM has a two-fold incentive to integrate forward as the natural gains which stem from eliminating successive monopolies and those gained by practicing implicit price discrimination are substantial.5
The present paper will evaluate vertical integration when the UM serves a set of spatially dispersed downstream monopolists (DMs). This setting reflects Romano (1988) , but requires more detailed analysis in providing rather significant results.
Unlike the instances where perfectly competitive downstream industries (or firms) are assumed, the set of DIs (or DMs) into which the UM can integrate and successfully practice implicit price discrimination is unconstrained. However, the impacts on social welfare are ambiguous and depend essentially on the integration strategy the UM firm will adopt. For example, the impacts on social welfare depend on which downstream firm the UM firm will integrate with. If the UM integrates with a DM possessing a relatively inelastic demand for the UM's product, final output prices fall in both the integrated and non-integrated sectors. In this case, there is a Pareto improvement. However, if the UM integrates with a DM possessing a relatively elastic demand for the UM's product, then output price falls in the integrated sector but output price rises in the non-integrated firm.
Here, the effect on social welfare is ambiguous.
Since the price discrimination that is associated with vertical integration can become a severe problem in anti-trust proceedings, the welfare results that can be derived have important implications for antitrust policy. Recognize in this regard that if the UM can integrate with only a specific spatially dispersed downstream monopolist, for example because of governmentally imposed development policy, the effect of implicit price discrimination on social welfare is necessarily ambiguous. In fact, it depends on the type of consumers demanding the product and the locations of rival firms.
A more sophisticated analysis of consumer types is required than that which traditional nonspatial theory provides. A main purpose of this paper is therefore to ascertain the impact on social welfare of the vertical integration of spatially separated monopolists, and its implications in the sense of regional policy.
The Basic Model
Our basic assumptions are as follows: 1. A UM produces good v at constant marginal cost c.
2. There are two spatially dispersed monopolists using v as an input This condition eliminates the incentive to integrate which otherwise derives from downstream technologies that involve variable proportions in production.6 5. For simplicity, a perfectly elastic supply of other inputs applies in the production of x.
Thus, monopsony incentives to integrate do not exist and we can employ the elemen tary production function: xi=divi, where vi stands for the employment of v in DMi .7
6. Since the two DMs are assumed to be located at different points, we shall, for simplicity and convenience, assume that the two downstream sellers (firms 1 and 2) located respectively near to and at a substantial distance from the UM: in addition, (again see note 9). For simplicity, the strong DM will henceforth be specified by use of the subscript s and the weak DM by the subscript w.
The Analysis
If price discrimination is not practiced, the UM must supply both DMs at the same price. By integrating forward with one of the DMs, the UM acquires a monopoly, so that it is able to supply the non-integrated DM at the appropriate discriminatory price without fear of entry into the newly integrated firm.
While the above discussion may appear to be strained in the case of only two DMs, it warrants advance note that the following results generalize to the cases of any number of DMs. In contrast to the situations discussed in the literature with competitive DMs, the set of firms into which the UM can profitably integrate is unconstrained and the supply price of v, following integration, can fall to the UM's optimum level. Consider, according ly, the following:
After integration takes place, a strategy of charging the appropriate discriminatory price to the non-integrated DM and internally transferring v in the integrated industry at the pre-integration price (z*) generates a profitable integration. However, the UM can increase its profits still further by the internal transfer of v at the integrated firm's marginal cost. Hence, there is a twofold incentive to integrate, where the second part of the gain from integration comes from eliminating the successive monopoly effect in the integrated industry, which condition does not apply of course to a competitive firm situation. All gains from price discrimination are easily obtained by the integration of the UM with either of the DM firms. The incentive to integrate with the DM resolves the successive-monopoly distortion. Hence, if the act of integration is costless and not prohibited, the UM would optimally integrate with each of the DMs. However, the situation for integration is not frictionless. The costs include the legal costs involved in integrations besides the management cost in directing two spatially separated DMs. This latter cost, namely that which is involved in directing spatially separated DMs requires further discussion, not only because of the complexity of managing the firms but because of the problems of regional integration.
Manifestly, the latter problems are most impor tant for countries which are inclined to plan national economic growth over time. For example, the authority in certain developing countries may suggest that any UM which cannot integrate with all DMs because of the cost of management should integrate with at least one of the downstream firms towards the end of advancing regional development.
Or, the authority may allow the UM, which can integrate with all downstream firms, to integrate with only one of the downstream firms because of a desire to maintain certain facets of an antitrust policy.
In the situations described above, questions arise as to which firms should be selected for integration by the UM when downstream firms are spatially separated? As far as social welfare is concerned, the result depends largely on the type of cosumer demand that holds for the final product and the specific locations of the downstream firms.
A Proposition and Its Corollary
Consider the case of integrating with only one firm among two downstream firms: Proof of proposition 1. When the UM integrates with the strong (weak) DM, the optimal supply price of v becomes the discriminatory price zwd (zsd). The first statement then follows immediately from (3). After integration, it is definitely optimal to transfer v in the newly integrated firm at the marginal cost c. It follows that the internal price 'falls' after integration, since zid>c, i=w, s.
The proof of corollary 1 is rather obvious. Note that if the basic derived input demand curve is less (more) convex, the net derived input demand curve becomes more elastic (inelastic) as the distance between UM and the DM increases. Hence, if the derived input demand curve is less convex, the DM located near to UM (DM located far from UM) becomes the strong (weak) market.
Completely opposite results hold if the basic derived input demand curve is more convex.
The intuition behind proposition 1 (and corollary 1) is straightforward. The strong (weak) DM puts upward (downward) pressure on the supply price of v. The elimination of the firm as a market-demander through the integration reverses this effect. Here, it is desirable to mention a rather practical implication of corollary 1. As far as the supply price of the input is concerned, it seems desirable at first glance for the UM to integrate with the DM which is located near to the UM. Furthermore, the UM has an incentive to integrate with the proximate DM because the integrated (proximate) DM obtains the input at a lower transportation cost. However, these relationships hold only if the basic input demand curve is of the less convex type; if the basic input demand curve is of the more convex kind, the UM should integrate with the DM which is located far from the UM.
This integration with DM2 brings about the the lower supply price of the input v. The specification as to the type of demand curve (less convex, more convex) can therefore be expected to be relevant to the matter of welfare effects, which matter can now be discussed with advantage.
Social Welfare and Other Propositions
Unless otherwise indicated, our measure of social welfare is consumer surplus plus producer surplus. We thus obtain: Proposition 2. Integration by the UM with the strong DM results in Pareto improve ment. Integration by the UM with the weak DM may or may not generate an increase in social welfare. Corollary 2. Integration by the UM with the DM located near to (far from) the UM results in Pareto improvement if the basic derived input demand curve is less (more) convex. Integration by the UM with the DM located at a substantial distance from (near to) the UM may or may not lead to social welfare improvement if the basic derived input demand is less (more) convex.
Proof of proposition 2. Let pmi (ki) be the monopoly price of xi given that the full price of v, is ki (=zi+tri).
Of course, dpmi/dki>0 for xi(pmi)>0; and also pmi(c+tri)>0, where c is a constant marginal cost of vi. If integration is with the strong DM, it follows from proposition 1 that pmw(zwd+tr)<pmw(z*+tr); i.e. the final output price in the nonintegrated firm is decreased. On the other hand, pms(zsd+tr)>pms(z*+tr) if the integra tion is with the weak DM. In either case, pmi(c+tr)<pmi(z*+tr).
Recall further that c is the assumed constant marginal cost of the input vi and pi(c+tr)
is the price that prevails in the integrated industry following integration. In the case of integration with the strong DM, consumers of both DMs are better off since the final prices of each firm are decreased. The weak DM is better off because the supply price of v has gone down; meanwhile, the UM and strong DM are also better off as their joint profits have risen.
Because the supply price of v rises in the case of integration with the weak DM, the strong DM is less well off and so too are the consumers in this market. However, both the UM and the weak DM are better off as in the case of integration with the strong DM. Neither effect dominates in general, as can be shown upon request of the author.10 For present purposes, it suffices to reflect on the practical implications of colollary 2.
As in the case of corollary 2, simple selection of the DM located proximate to the UM does not always increase social welfare nor does it always result in Pareto improvement. The selection of the downstream firm and the related impact on welfare requires detailed analysis of the demand convexity of the derived spatial input demand curve. 
